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Abstract
The paper concerns a dynamic model of influence in which agents make a yes-no
decision. Each agent has an initial opinion which he may change during different
phases of interaction, due to mutual influence among agents. We investigate a
model of influence based on aggregation functions. Each agent modifies his opinion
independently of the others, by aggregating the current opinion of all agents. Our
framework covers numerous existing models of opinion formation, since we allow
for arbitrary aggregation functions. We provide a general analysis of convergence
in the aggregation model and find all terminal classes and states. We show that
possible terminal classes to which the process of influence may converge are termi-
nal states (the consensus states and non trivial states), cyclic terminal classes, and
unions of Boolean lattices (called regular terminal classes). An agent is influential
for another agent if the opinion of the first one matters for the latter. A gener-
alization of influential agent to an irreducible coalition whose opinion matters for
an agent is called influential coalition. The graph (hypergraph) of influence is a
graphical representation of influential agents (coalitions). Based on properties of
the hypergraphs of influence we obtain conditions for the existence of the different
kinds of terminal classes. An important family of aggregation functions – the family
of symmetric decomposable models – is discussed. Finally, based on the results of
the paper, we analyze the manager network of Krackhardt.
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1 Introduction
Influence and opinion formation are broadly studied in several scientific fields, e.g., in
psychology, sociology, economics, marketing, mathematics, physics. Important contribu-
tions to the study of these issues can be found in the literature on dynamic aspects of
influence; see, e.g., Jackson (2008) for an overview of dynamic models of imitation and
social influence. One of the leading models of opinion and consensus formation is due to
DeGroot (1974). In his model, every individual in a society has an initial opinion on a
subject, represented by a number in [0, 1], and he aggregates the opinions of other indi-
viduals through a weighted arithmetic mean. The interaction patterns are described by
a stochastic matrix whose entries represent weights that an agent places on the current
opinions of other agents in forming his own opinion for the next period. The opinions
are updated over time. Results in Markov chain theory are easily adapted to the model.
Several works have been devoted to the DeGroot framework and its different variations
have been proposed. However, although the literature on influence and opinion forma-
tion is quite vast, most of the related works assume a convex combination as the way of
aggregating opinions. In Section 7 we present a brief description of the DeGroot model
as well as a survey of the related literature.
In this paper we investigate a new approach to influence based on aggregation func-
tions. The point of departure is a one-step model (Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010,
2011)) in which agents make a yes-no decision on a certain issue. While each agent has
his preliminary opinion (inclination), he may decide differently from that inclination, due
to influence between agents. A transformation from the agents inclinations to their de-
cisions is represented by an influence function. In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010) we
investigate some tools to analyze influence in this one-step framework. In particular, we
define the influence indices to measure the influence of a coalition on an agent, introduce
several influence functions and investigate the concept of a follower of a coalition. Also
in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011) the one-step model of influence is examined, but
we establish there the exact relations between the key concepts of the influence model
and the framework of command games by Hu and Shapley (2003a,b). In particular, the
concept of an influence function is extensively studied. The present paper extends our
previous research on influence in several aspects. While influence functions considered
so far were any kind of deterministic function, with a decision process after a single step
of influence, we consider now a dynamic influence mechanism which is assumed to be
stochastic and to follow a stationary Markov chain. Moreover, the formation of opinions
is based on aggregation functions.
Restricting the analysis to stationary Markov processes allows us to model the in-
fluence phenomenon that differs from learning process. Our framework can be seen as
a reasonable approximation of reality when a committee of individuals is already estab-
lished for a while. Its members know each other well, and while they can be sensitive
to arguments of some members of the committee, they do not really follow influence
attempts of other members. Then, most probably the process should be stationary, as
learning is known to be more active at the early stage. Concerning the Markovian as-
sumption, it is likely that for some reasons agents cannot or do not want to keep a long
memory of all previous opinions. Discussions might become too long and tiring, many
people express their opinions, so it becomes too complicated to recall all of them, or
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discussed issues are not that important for an agent to memorize all previous meetings.
Hence, we believe that in many decision making environments, it is essentially the last
opinion which matters for influence.
There are three main contributions of the present paper to the study of influence,
and basically three advantages of our framework over other existing models. First of all,
we introduce and analyze a new framework of influence based on arbitrary aggregation
functions, which to the best of our knowledge has not been proposed before. Each agent
modifies his opinion by aggregating the current opinion of all agents (possibly including
himself) according to his aggregation function. The framework covers numerous existing
models of opinion formation, since we allow for arbitrary aggregation functions. We
provide a general analysis of convergence in the aggregation model. First, we show that
possible terminal classes to which the process of influence may converge are terminal
states (the consensus states and non trivial states), cyclic terminal classes, and unions of
Boolean lattices (called regular terminal classes). Next, we use the concepts of influential
agent and graph of influence. Roughly speaking, an agent j is yes- (or no-) influential
for agent i if the opinion of j matters for i. The graph of yes-influence (no-influence)
is a directed graph whose nodes are the agents and there is an arc from j to i if j is
yes-influential (no-influential) for i. A direct generalization of these notions leads to
influential coalitions and hypergraphs of yes- (or no-) influence. It appears that the
qualitative description of the convergence is entirely described by the hypergraphs of
influence. Based on properties of the hypergraphs and influential coalitions we determine
conditions for the existence of the different types of terminal classes. Furthermore, we
study a specific family of aggregation models – the family of symmetric decomposable
models, in which all influential coalitions are singletons and the graphs of yes- and no-
influence coincide. Terminal classes in such models are analyzed.
The second advantage of the present model concerns the reduction of complexity.
We assume that the influence mechanism is a Markovian process. Consequently, for the
analysis of the qualitative convergence in a model with n agents we need the information
on all entries of the 2n × 2n (reduced) transition matrix. While the Markovian model
of influence is exponentially complex, the subfamily based on aggregation functions is
of polynomial complexity. Indeed, in order to determine all terminal classes in the ag-
gregation model we only need to know the hypergraphs of yes- and no-influence, whose
maximal size is 2n
(
n
⌊n/2⌋
)
. Note that the size difference between the Markovian model of
influence and the aggregation model drastically increases with n.
The third advantage of the present model is related to practical considerations and
applicability of the model. When we know exactly how each agent aggregates the current
opinions of others when modifying his own opinion for the next step and how they are
correlated, we can provide the full analysis of convergence. However, in practice, we
frequently do not know how the aggregation is done by the agents. In our model, for the
analysis of the qualitative convergence we do not need the full information on the agents’
aggregation functions. What we only need to know are all influential coalitions, but this
information can usually be obtained by observing the influence process.
In order to show the advantages of the aggregation framework over other existing mod-
els we study an empirical example based on the advice network of Krackhardt (1987). He
collected data from managers of a small manufacturing firm in the US about who sought
advice from whom. Based on these data, Jackson (2008) developed a social influence
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matrix as defined in the context of the DeGroot model. We apply our approach to the
same advice network of Krackhardt (1987) and provide the convergence analysis of the
example. Moreover, for simplicity of the illustration and discussion of our results, we
additionally analyze a smaller example of the advice network with 3 managers who have
to decide whether to introduce a new technology in the company. The discussion on that
issue may take many rounds and every manager may seek advice from the others before
each round. Apart from the classical approach of weighted averaging aggregation, one
can easily imagine different ways of aggregating the opinions by the managers.
The remainder of the paper is the following. In Section 2 we introduce the model.
The concepts of influential agents (influential coalitions) and (hyper)graphs of influence
are defined in Section 3. In Section 4 we provide a general analysis of convergence in the
aggregation model. In Section 5 a specific family of aggregation functions – symmetric
decomposable model – is discussed. In Section 6 we analyze the empirical example of
Krackhardt (1987). Section 7 contains a brief survey of the related literature. In Section
8 we conclude with some practical considerations. The proofs of our results are placed in
the Appendix.
2 Modelling influence by aggregation functions
2.1 Description of the model
We consider a setN := {1, . . . , n} of agents having to make a yes-no decision for approving
a bill, a project, a candidate, etc. (typically these agents form a committee). Each agent
is supposed to have an initial opinion (called inclination), but during the different phases
of the discussion, agents may change their initial opinion due to mutual influence among
agents. (Grabisch and Rusinowska, 2010).
Given a situation S, there is a certain probability bS,T that the set of ‘yes’-voters after
one step of influence is T . If we assume that the process of influence may iterate (several
rounds in the discussion), we obtain a stochastic process, called the influence process1,
depicting the evolution of the coalition of ‘yes’-agents along time. We make here the
following simplifying assumptions, which seem reasonable in our context of influence:
(i) The process is Markovian, i.e., the probability bS,T depends on S (the present
situation) and T (the future situation), and not on the whole history.
(ii) The process is stationary, i.e., bS,T is constant over time.
States of this finite Markovian process are therefore all subsets S ⊆ N , representing
the set of ‘yes’-agents; its transition matrix B := [bS,T ]S,T⊆N is a 2
n × 2n row-stochastic
matrix.
Markov theory provides a complete description of the convergence of the process
through the matrix B. This description can be qualitative, that is, it gives the terminal
states and classes together with their type (periodic or not) in which the process will
eventually converge (see definitions below), or quantitative, i.e., it gives in addition the
1If the process is deterministic, we call it simply an influence function B : 2N → 2N (see (Grabisch
and Rusinowska, 2010)).
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probability that the process converges in a given terminal class, as well as the probability
of each state in a terminal class. While the full quantitative description requires the
knowledge of B, it is known from Markov chain theory that the qualitative description
needs only the knowledge of the reduced matrix B˜, where
b˜S,T =
{
1, if bS,T > 0
0, otherwise.
The reduced matrix can be equivalently represented by a graph Γ = (2N , E), called the
transition graph, where E is the set of arcs. Γ is a directed graph (digraph), whose vertices
are all possible coalitions, and an arc (S, T ) from state S to state T exists if and only if
b˜S,T = 1.
A path in Γ from S to T is a sequence of states S = S0, S1, S2, . . . , Sk−1, Sk = T such
that (Si, Si+1) ∈ E for i = 0, . . . , k − 1.
Definition 1. Let C be a nonempty collection of states. C is strongly connected if either
C = {S}, or for every distinct S, T ∈ C, there is a path in C from S to T and from T to
S. Moreover, C is a class2 if it is strongly connected and maximal for this property (i.e.,
any addition of a new state in C makes this property false).
A class is either transient or terminal. It is transient if there are states S ∈ C and
T 6∈ C such that (S, T ) ∈ E (we call it an outgoing arc). Therefore, a terminal class has
no outgoing arc, and therefore the process always converges to one of the terminal classes.
If a terminal class is reduced to a single state, we call it a terminal state. A terminal
class C is periodic if there exists a partition {P1, . . . , Pq} of C such that for r = 1, . . . , q,
if the process is in a state belonging to Pr at time t, it will be in a state of Pr+1 (letting
Pq+1 = P1) at time t+ 1. Otherwise, C is said to be aperiodic.
The qualitative analysis of convergence therefore amounts to finding all terminal
classes and terminal states, as well as their type (periodic or aperiodic).
Definition 2. We say that two influence processes are qualitatively equivalent if they
have the same transition graphs (equivalently, the same reduced matrices), i.e., if they
converge to the same terminal classes.
The influence process is a very general model, whose only restrictions are the Marko-
vian and stationarity assumptions. The price to pay for this generality is the exponential
complexity of the model: the transition matrix has size 2n × 2n, which makes it usable
only for a small number of agents. This motivates the search for subfamilies of polynomial
complexity, yet enough general to cover most of real situations. We propose here such a
family, whose basic idea is very simple. It assumes that each agent modifies his opinion
by aggregating the current opinion of all agents, possibly including himself. The precise
way of aggregating opinions is characteristic to each agent, so that agents may have all
different procedures for aggregating. The aggregation procedure is numerical, coding ‘yes’
by 1 and ‘no’ by 0. The result of aggregation is a number between 0 and 1, representing
the probability that the considered agent says ‘yes’. For example, the simplest procedure
of aggregation is to count the number of ‘yes’-agents and to divide by n: the more agents
2also called a strongly connected component.
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say ‘yes’, the more you are inclined to say ‘yes’. One can also make a weighted count,
putting weights on agents3, or imagine any kind of procedure, provided it is rational in
the following sense: take S, S ′ two sets of ‘yes’-agents, and suppose that S ⊆ S ′. Then
the probability to say ‘yes’ for the S ′ situation should be at least equal to the probability
for the S situation. This assumption supposes that influence is “positive”, that is, agents
tend to follow the trend. One can consider as well “negative” influence, where agents
modify their opinion in reaction to the opinion of the others: the more agents say ‘yes’,
the more they are inclined to say ‘no’. In this case, just the opposite assumption on the
aggregation procedure must be taken. In the rest of the paper, we deal only with positive
influence.
Definition 3. An n-place aggregation function is any mapping A : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] satis-
fying
(i) A(0, . . . , 0) = 0, A(1, . . . , 1) = 1 (boundary conditions)
(ii) If x ≤ x′ then A(x) ≤ A(x′) (nondecreasingness).
Aggregation functions are well-studied and there exist many families of them: all kinds
of means (geometric, harmonic, quasi-arithmetic) and their weighted version, weighted
ordered averages, any combination of minimum and maximum (lattice polynomials or
Sugeno integrals), Choquet integrals, triangular norms, copulas, etc. (see Grabisch et al.
(2009) and Section 5).
To each agent i ∈ N we associate an aggregation function Ai, specifying the way
agent i modifies his opinion from the opinion of the other agents and himself. We denote
by A := (A1, . . . , An) the vector of aggregation functions. Specifically, supposing that S
is the set of agents saying ‘yes’, we compute A(1S) = (A1(1S), . . . , An(1S)), where 1S is
the characteristic vector of S, i.e., (1S)j = 1 if j ∈ S and (1S)j = 0 otherwise. Vector
A(1S) indicates the probability of each agent to say ‘yes’ after influence. In particular, if
we assume that these probabilities are independent among agents, then the probability
of transition from the yes-coalition S to the yes-coalition T is
bS,T =
∏
i∈T
Ai(1S)
∏
i6∈T
(1− Ai(1S)), (1)
which determines B. It follows that deterministic models correspond to aggregation
functions satisfying Ai(1S) ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N (let us call them Boolean aggregation
functions). An important remark is that the reduced matrix B˜ is insensitive to possible
correlation among agents. Indeed, b˜S,T = 1 if and only if Ai(1S) > 0 for all i ∈ T and
< 1 for all i 6∈ T , regardless of the correlation among agents.
2.2 Examples of aggregating opinions in the advice network
In order to illustrate the above notions, we consider an example of an advice network
inspired by the example of Krackhardt (1987). There are n managers in a company
3These weights reflect to which extent an agent takes into account the opinion of the others. For
example, in models of contagion (Morris, 2000), or diffusion (Lo´pez-Pintado, 2010), each agent is only
influenced by his neighbors. Note also that if two agents cannot communicate, this can be represented
by zero weights.
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who discuss whether to introduce a new technology in the company. The discussion
takes many rounds. The initial opinions of all managers are common knowledge. How
do managers form their opinion during the discussion? Do they change their opinion in
different rounds? Are they influenced by other managers? Do they reach a consensus? To
which terminal class does the influence process converge? Let us start with considering
three very natural ways of forming an opinion. The full example of Krackhardt will be
studied in Section 6.
Example 1 (The guru influence function). Let k˜ ∈ N be a particular manager
called the guru, who has the property that every manager always follows the opinion of
the guru. Therefore, the aggregation functions of all managers are identical and given by
Ai(1S) = 1 if S ∋ k˜, and 0 otherwise.
The convergence of the process is extremely simple: it converges in one step to either
N or ∅, depending whether the opinion of the guru is ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
Example 2 (The majority influence function). One of the natural ways of making
a decision in an influence environment is to decide according to the inclination of the
majority. In other words, if the majority of managers has a ‘yes’ inclination, then all
managers decide ‘yes’, and if not, then all managers decide ‘no’. Let n ≥ q > ⌊n
2
⌋
represent the majority threshold. Then, all managers have the same aggregation function
which is Boolean: Ai(1S) = 1 if |S| ≥ q, and 0 otherwise.
Obviously, ∅ and N are terminal states, and the convergence is also reached in one
step.
Example 3 (The mass psychology influence process). Let ε denote either ‘yes’ or
‘no’, and ε¯ denote the opposite of ε. Mass psychology influence (also called herd behavior,
see Banerjee (1992)) means that if there is a sufficient number of managers with opinion
ε, they will possibly attract some managers with inclination ε¯ and make them change
their opinion. Let n ≥ q > ⌊n
2
⌋. The mass psychology function Mass[q] (Grabisch and
Rusinowska, 2010) satisfies
if |S| ≥ q, then Mass[q](S) ⊇ S, and if |N \ S| ≥ q, then Mass[q](S) ⊆ S.
An example of the stochastic version of this mass psychology function (with uniform
distribution) (n = 3, q = 2) is given by the following transition matrix:
Mass[2] =
∅.5 1.5 2.5 12 3.5 13 23 123
∅
1
2
12
3
13
23
123

1 1 2 12 3 13 23 123
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
1

(2)
where a “blank” entry means zero. The associated transition graph is given in Figure
1. Again, ∅ and 123 are terminal states. For the mass psychology influence process in
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∅1 2 3
12 13 23
123
Figure 1: The transition graph of the mass psychology influence process Mass[2] for n = 3
the general case, with n > 3 and q > ⌊n
2
⌋, the following is easy to establish: If the
initial state S0 satisfies |S0| ≥ q, then it converges to N with probability 1 (under some
mild conditions on the transition matrix). If |S0| ≤ n − q, then it converges to ∅ with
probability 1.
Suppose that for each situation (S ⊆ N , ε =‘yes’ or ‘no’), the probability pS,εi that
manager i ∈ N \ S changes his opinion is specified, and that managers in N \ S change
independently their opinion. Then this is equivalent to an aggregation model defined as
follows, for every S ⊆ N :
Ai(1S) =

1, if i ∈ S and |N \ S| < q
p
S,yes
i , if i ∈ N \ S and |S| ≥ q
0, if i ∈ N \ S and |S| < q
p
N\S,no
i , if i ∈ S and |N \ S| ≥ q.
The transition matrix (2) is then recovered as follows:
A1(1 0 0) = 0.5, A2(1 0 0) = 0, A3(1 0 0) = 0
A1(0 1 0) = 0, A2(0 1 0) = 0.5, A3(0 1 0) = 0
A1(0 0 1) = 0, A2(0 0 1) = 0, A3(0 0 1) = 0.5
A1(1 1 0) = 1, A2(1 1 0) = 1, A3(1 1 0) = 0.5
A1(1 0 1) = 1, A2(1 0 1) = 0.5, A3(1 0 1) = 1
A1(0 1 1) = 0.5, A2(0 1 1) = 1, A3(0 1 1) = 1.
3 Influential coalitions and hypergraphs of influence
3.1 Influential players and influential coalitions
The following notions are fundamental in our analysis of convergence.
Definition 4. Consider an influence model based on aggregation functionsA = (A1, . . . , An).
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(i) Agent j ∈ N is yes-influential in Ai if Ai(1j) > 0.
(ii) Agent j ∈ N is no-influential in Ai if Ai(1N\j) < 1.
(iii) The graph of yes-influence is a directed graph Gyes
A
= (N,E) whose set of nodes is
N , and there is an arc (j, i) from j to i if j is yes-influential in Ai. The graph of
no-influence Gno
A
is defined similarly.
We comment on these definitions. Roughly speaking, an agent j is (yes- or no-)
influential for agent i if the opinion of j matters for i. Indeed, supposing i 6= j, even
if everybody but agent j says ‘no’, there is a positive probability that agent i changes
his mind due to the influence of j (and similarly if ‘yes’ is replaced by ‘no’, since the
vector 1N\j depicts a situation where every agent says ‘yes’, except agent j). Note that
the monotonicity of aggregation functions entails that when j is yes-influential in Ai,
Ai(1S) > 0 whenever S ∋ j, and Ai(1S) < 1 if S 6∋ j when j is no-influential. Also, if
all Ai are increasing functions, then the graphs of yes- and no-influence coincide and are
complete with a loop on each node.
The graphs of influence give then a clear view of who influences whom. They give a
formal and simple definition of a notion often used in the literature4. Figure 2 gives the
yes-influential graph of our three examples (the no-influential graph is the same).
12 5
3 4
67 1 2 3
4 5 6
1 2
3
Figure 2: The graph of yes-influence of the guru influence function (left; n = 7, agent 1
is the guru), the majority influence function (middle, n = 6), and the mass psychology
influence process (right, n = 3, corresponds to the transition matrix (2))
The graph of the guru influence function is a star, showing clearly the roˆle of the
guru. By contrast, the two other graphs do not reveal anything clear on the influence.
This is because no particular agent is really influential in these models. Influence is done
only by means of the number of people having the same opinion. This shows that graphs
of influence, though convenient and intuitive, cannot explain all phenomena of influence,
and that we need a more powerful concept.
Definition 5. Let Ai be the aggregation function of agent i. A nonempty coalition
S ⊆ N is yes-influential for i if
(i) Ai(1S) > 0
(ii) For all S ′ ⊂ S, Ai(1S′) = 0.
4Aracena et al. (2004) define the connection graph, which is very close to ours: there is an arc (i, j)
if the (Boolean) aggregation function Aj depends on the input of i.
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Similarly, a coalition S is no-influential for i if
(i) Ai(1N\S) < 1
(ii) For all S ′ ⊂ S, Ai(1N\S′) = 1.
Call Cyesi and C
no
i the collections of yes- and no-influential coalitions for i. Note that
these collections are never empty because if they do not contain any proper subset of
N , they must contain N by virtue of the conditions Ai(1N) = 1 and Ai(1∅) = 0. Also
these collections are antichains, i.e., any two sets in Cyesi or C
no
i are incomparable w.r.t. set
inclusion.
Influential coalitions clearly generalize influential agents5. Coalition S is yes-influential
for agent i if, when agents in S say ‘yes’ and every other agent says ‘no’, agent i has a
positive probability to say ‘yes’ (and similarly for no-influential coalitions). Condition
(ii) in each definition merely says that no subcoalition of S satisfies the first condition,
which means that S has no superfluous agent.
It seems that there is no easy way to have a graphical representation of influential
coalitions. Theoretical results on convergence in Section 4 will show that the notion of
hypergraph is the most natural one, although admittedly difficult to visualize.
Definition 6. We define the following concepts:
(i) A hypergraph (Berge, 1976) H is a pair (N, E) where N is the set of nodes and E
the set of hyperedges, where an hyperedge S ∈ E is a nonempty subset of N . Note
that if |S| = 2 for all S ∈ E , then we have a classical graph.
(ii) A directed hypergraph on N is a hypergraph on N where each hyperedge S is an
ordered pair (S ′, S ′′) (which we call an hyperarc from S ′ to S ′′), with S ′, S ′′ being
nonempty and S ′ ∪ S ′′ = S. If in addition S ′ ∩ S ′′ = ∅, the hyperarc is normal.
(iii) A directed hyperpath from i to j is a sequence i0S1i1S2i2 · · · iq−1Sqiq, where i0 :=
i, i1, . . . , iq−1, j =: iq are nodes, S1 = (S
′
1, S
′′
1 ), . . . , Sq = (S
′
q, S
′′
q ) are hyperarcs such
that S ′k ∋ ik−1 and S
′′
k ∋ ik for all k = 1, . . . , q. A directed hypercycle is a directed
hyperpath with i0 = iq.
(iv) The hypergraph is strongly connected if each pair of nodes i, j is connected through
directed hyperpaths from i to j, and from j to i.
(v) For any hypergraph H we define its restricted version Hˆ by removing all nonnormal
hyperarcs.
(vi) Given an influence model based on aggregation functions A, we define the hyper-
graphs H
yes
A
, Hno
A
of yes-influence and no-influence as follows. For Hyes
A
, the set of
nodes is N , and there is an hyperarc (C, {i}) for each C ∈ Cyesi (similarly for H
no
A
).
5Influential coalitions give a qualitative description of influence. For having a quantitative point
of view, we may consider the quantities Ai(1S) (probability that i says ‘yes’ if only S says ‘yes’) and
1−Ai(1N\S) (probability that i says ‘no’ if only S says ‘no’) as yes- and no-degree of influence of S over
i, or generalize the notion of influence index proposed in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010).
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Since Cyesi and C
no
i are antichains, there is no hyperarc included into another one, but
the hyperarcs are not necessarily normal. Clearly, hypergraphs of influence generalize
graphs of influence in the sense that if influential coalitions reduce to singletons (influential
agents), then the hypergraphs reduce to graphs of influence. Note also that because of
condition (ii) in Definition 5, in any case, the hypergraphs of influence contain their
respective graphs of influence.
We illustrate these notions considering our previous examples. We find easily that:
(i) For the guru function, only the guru is influential, and there is no other influential
coalition. Therefore, the hypergraphs of influence reduce to the graphs of influence.
(ii) For the majority function, each collection Cyesi contains all coalitions of exactly q
agents, while Cnoi contains all coalitions of exactly n− q + 1 agents.
(iii) For the mass psychology influence process with n = 3 and transition matrix (2), we
have Cyes1 = C
no
1 = {1, 23}, C
yes
2 = C
no
2 = {2, 13} and C
yes
3 = C
no
3 = {3, 12}. Hence,
the yes- and no-influential hypergraphs are identical (see Figure 3).
1 2
3
Figure 3: Hypergraph Hyes
A
for the mass psychology influence process with transition
matrix (2)
3.2 Equivalence between influence hypergraphs and the ma-
trix B˜
A fundamental question is: To what extent do the influence hypergraphs represent the
Markov process of influence? The size of the transition matrix is 22
n
, while the definition
of the hypergraphs amounts to list 2n antichains, of size at most
(
n
⌊n
2
⌋
)
. Table 1 shows
n = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
size of the transition matrix 16 64 256 1024 4096 16384 65536
maximal size of the hypergraphs 8 18 48 100 240 490 1120
Table 1: Comparison of the sizes of the models
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clearly that hypergraphs take much less space, so that we may be inclined to think that
hypergraphs represent poorly the process of influence. Surprisingly, the next result shows
that hypergraphs are equivalent to the reduced matrix B˜, and therefore contain the entire
qualitative description of the convergence.
Theorem 1. Consider an influence process B based on aggregation functions A. Then
B˜ can be reconstructed from the hypergraphs Hyes
A
and Hno
A
as follows: for any S, T ∈ 2N ,
b˜S,T = 1 if and only if
(i) For each i ∈ T , there exists a nonempty S ′i ⊆ S such that S
′
i is yes-influential on i,
i.e., S ′i ∈ C
yes
i ; and
(ii) For each i 6∈ T , there exists a nonempty S ′′i such that S
′′
i ∩ S = ∅ and S
′′
i is
no-influential on i, i.e., S ′′i ∈ C
no
i .
In particular, b˜∅,T = 0 for all T 6= ∅, b∅,∅ = 1, and b˜N,T = 0 for all T 6= N , bN,N = 1.
Proof. Observe from (1) that bS,T > 0 if and only if Ai(1S) > 0 for all i ∈ T and
Ai(1S) < 1 for all i 6∈ T , and this remains true even if independence is not assumed.
Now by monotonicity of the aggregation functions, Ai(1S) > 0 is equivalent to say that
there exists a yes-influential coalition S ′i for i, which is included in S. On the other hand,
Ai(1S) < 1 means that there exists some coalition S
′
i 6= N containing S such that N \ S
′
i
is no-influential on i. Lastly, note that (N \ S ′i) ∩ S = ∅, and letting S
′′
i = N \ S
′
i the
proof is complete.
The main consequence of this result is that hypergraphs (or equivalently, the collec-
tions Cyesi , C
no
i , i ∈ N) constitute a very efficient representation of the influence process,
able to fully describe the qualitative convergence. Moreover, this description is valid even
if statistical independence between the players does not hold.
We end this section by noting that if A is Boolean (i.e., all aggregation functions are
0-1-valued), then the collections Cyesi , ∀i ∈ N , entirely determine A (and therefore the
transition matrix B if the correlation among players is known). Indeed, Ai(1S) = 1 if
and only if S ⊇ C for some C ∈ Cyesi , and is 0 otherwise. The same conclusion holds for
the collections Cnoi , ∀i ∈ N .
4 Convergence in the aggregation model
We provide here a general analysis of convergence of influence processes based on aggre-
gation functions.
4.1 Types of terminal classes
In all examples given above, we can see that the process converges to the consensus states
N or ∅, i.e., the states where all managers have the same opinion. It is easy to see that
the two consensus states are always terminal states, even if other terminal classes may
exist. Indeed, for every aggregation function Ai(1N) = 1 and Ai(0, . . . , 0) = 0, hence
(1, . . . , 1) and (0, . . . , 0) are fixed points of A. Therefore, we call ∅ and N trivial terminal
states. Of course, other terminal classes are possible, as shown by the next theorem.
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Theorem 2. Consider an influence process B based on aggregation functions A. Then
terminal classes are:
(i) either singletons {S}, S ∈ 2N ;
(ii) or cycles of nonempty sets {S1, . . . , Sk} of any length 2 ≤ k ≤
(
n
⌊n/2⌋
)
(and there-
fore they are periodic of period k) with the condition that all sets are pairwise
incomparable (by inclusion);
(iii) or collections C of nonempty sets with the property that C = C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Cp, where
each subcollection Cj is a Boolean lattice [Sj , Sj ∪Kj ], Sj 6= ∅, Sj ∪Kj 6= N , and
at least one Kj is nonempty.
We call cyclic terminal classes those terminal classes of the second type and regular
terminal classes those of the third type. Regular terminal classes can be periodic (see
Example 5 below). Regular terminal classes formed by a single Boolean lattice [S, S ∪K]
are called Boolean terminal classes.
(see proof in the appendix)
We give some comments on this result, beginning with a simple corollary.
Corollary 1. If A is Boolean (i.e., valued in {0, 1}n), then terminal classes are either
terminal states or cycles.
Proof. Let A be Boolean and consider a terminal class {S1, . . . , Sk} with k > 1. Since
every transition is deterministic, the only possibility is that there exists a cycle passing
through each set of the class, hence the result.
Example 4 shows the existence of regular terminal classes.
Example 4. Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and the following aggregation functions:
A1(1 0 0) = 1 A2(1 0 0) = 0.5 A3(1 0 0) = 0
A1(0 1 0) = 0 A2(0 1 0) = 0.5 A3(0 1 0) = 0
A1(0 0 1) = 0 A2(0 0 1) = 0.5 A3(0 0 1) = 0.5
A1(1 1 0) = 1 A2(1 1 0) = 0.5 A3(1 1 0) = 0
A1(1 0 1) = 1 A2(1 0 1) = 0.5 A3(1 0 1) = 0.5
A1(0 1 1) = 1 A2(0 1 1) = 0.5 A3(0 1 1) = 1.
This gives the following digraph for the Markov chain:
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Clearly, {1, 12} is a regular terminal class.
The existence of cyclic terminal classes was already remarked by Aracena et al. (2004)
for the case of regular aggregation functions, together with the condition of incompara-
bility among sets in the cycle. We know by Sperner’s lemma that the longest possible
sequence of incomparable sets in 2N has length
(
n
⌊n/2⌋
)
, hence the upper limit of length.
Cyclic classes are not the only case of periodic terminal classes, as the following
example shows.
Example 5. Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and the following aggregation functions:
A(1 0 0) = A(1 1 0) = (0 x 1)
A(0 0 1) = A(0 1 1) = (1 x 0)
A(0 1 0) = A(0 0 0) = (0 0 0)
A(1 0 1) = A(1 1 1) = (1 1 1)
with arbitrary 0 < x < 1. Then {1, 3, 12, 23} forms a periodic terminal class of period 2
(see Figure 4, left). Now consider the following aggregation functions:
A(1 0 0) = A(1 1 0) = (0 0 1)
A(0 0 1) = (1 x 0)
A(0 1 0) = A(0 0 0) = (0 0 0)
A(1 0 1) = A(0 1 1) = A(1 1 1) = (1 1 1)
with arbitrary 0 < x < 1. Then {1, 3, 12} is a periodic class of period 2 with 3 sets (see
Figure 4, right).
Generally speaking, to construct a periodic regular terminal class of period k, one
needs k pairwise disjoint subcollections [Sj, Sj ∪Kj ], j = 1, . . . , k, with the usual restric-
tions on the Sj, Kj’s, and defines Ai(1S) = 1 if i ∈ Sj+1, Ai(1S) = x ∈ ]0, 1[ if i ∈ Kj+1,
and 0 otherwise, for all S ∈ [Sj , Sj ∪Kj ], identifying k + 1 with 1. Note that there is no
need to have the Kj’s of equal size (see Figure 4, right).
Theorem 2 shows the different kinds of terminal classes. We study each type separately
in the forthcoming sections.
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Figure 4: Examples of a periodic terminal class
4.2 Terminal states
Terminal states are relatively easy to study since these are fixed points of A, i.e., S is a
terminal state if and only if
Ai(1S) = 1 ∀i ∈ S, Ai(1S) = 0 otherwise. (3)
An interesting question is whether other terminal states than the trivial ones exist.
Indeed, trivial terminal states are the only possible consensus stable situations. If another
terminal state S 6= ∅, N exists, it means that eventually the society of agents will be cut
into two parts S and N \ S of opposite opinions. It is therefore fundamental to know
under which conditions this situation can arise.
We say that a coalition S has an ingoing hyperarc6 T = (T ′, T ′′) in some hypergraph
if T ′ ⊆ N \ S and T ′′ ⊆ S (and vice versa for outgoing).
Theorem 3. Consider an influence process B based on aggregation functions A. A
nonempty subset S ⊂ N is a (non trivial) terminal state if and only if it has no ingoing
hyperarc in the hypergraph (Hˆyes
A
)∗ ∪ Hˆno
A
, where (Hˆyes
A
)∗ is the hypergraph Hˆyes
A
with all
hyperarcs inverted.
Corollary 2. Consider an influence process B based on aggregation functions A. The
following holds.
(i) If the hypergraph (Hˆyes
A
)∗ ∪ Hˆno
A
is not strongly connected, then there exists a
nontrivial terminal state.
(ii) If the graph (Gyes
A
)∗∪Gno
A
is strongly connected, then there is no nontrivial terminal
state.
(iii) Suppose the hypergraphs Hyes
A
, Hno
A
reduce to ordinary graphs. Then (Gyes
A
)∗ ∪Gno
A
is strongly connected if and only if there is no nontrivial terminal state.
6Note that this definition makes sense only for normal hyperarcs.
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(see proofs in the appendix)
Note that the converse of (i) is not true in general, but (ii) says that the converse is
true for the “graph part” of (Hˆyes
A
)∗ ∪ Hˆno
A
. The combination of these two results yields
immediately (iii).
Let us apply these results to our previous examples.
(i) In the guru example, Gyes
A
and Gno
A
are a star centered on k˜ with arcs going from k˜
into all agents. Hence, (Gyes
A
)∗ ∪Gno
A
is strongly connected, and by Corollary 2 (ii),
there is no nontrivial terminal state.
(ii) Let us show by Theorem 3 that for the majority function there is no nontrivial
terminal state. Due to symmetry, it suffices to show that any set S has some
ingoing arc in Hˆno
A
or some outgoing arc in Hˆyes
A
. The latter is true if |S| ≥ q since
it contains an influential set of size q. If |S| < q, then |N \ S| > n− q, hence N \ S
contains a no-influential set, which influences any element of S in particular.
(iii) Theorem 3 applied to the mass psychology example (see Figure 3) easily yields that
no nontrivial terminal states can exist.
(iv) In Example 4, we see that agent 1 is yes-influential in A1, all agents are yes- and
no-influential in A2, and agent 3 is yes-influential in A3, while agents 2,3 are no-
influential in A3. The graph (G
yes
A
)∗ ∪Gno
A
is depicted below.
1 2
3
Clearly, the graph is strongly connected. Hence by Corollary 2 (ii), there is no
nontrivial terminal state.
4.3 Regular terminal classes
We turn to the study of regular terminal classes. As for nontrivial terminal states, it is
important to know when they exist. Indeed, if a Boolean terminal class [S, S ∪K] exists,
it means that no consensus is reached, but all agents in S agree to say ‘yes’, while all
agents in N \ (S ∪ K) agree to say ‘no’. The agents in K oscillate between ‘yes’ and
‘no’ in all possibles ways, without ending. If there are several Boolean lattices in the
class, the interpretation is more complex but similar, and depends on how exactly are
the transitions between the lattices.
The following result permits to check if a strongly connected set of states (see Defini-
tion 1) is a Boolean terminal class.
Theorem 4. Consider an influence process B based on aggregation functions A, and let
[S, S∪K] be strongly connected in the transition graph Γ, where S 6= ∅, K 6= ∅, S∪K 6= N .
It is a Boolean terminal class if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) There is no ingoing hyperarc of Hˆno
A
into S
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(ii) There is no outgoing hyperarc of Hˆyes
A
from S ∪K.
(see proof in the appendix)
Theorem 4 shows that S forms an isolated group, receiving no no-influence, and yes-
influencing only the agents in K. Hence, in some sense S ∪K forms a subsociety ruled
by S.
For regular classes which are not Boolean, it is possible to get results if one considers
the “graph part” of the hypergraphs (i.e., influential agents). First we set some notations.
A regular terminal class has the form C =
⋃p
k=1[Sk, Sk ∪ Kk], with the restrictions on
Sk, Kk as in Theorem 2. Let us introduce the lower and upper bounds of C:
S∗ =
p⋂
k=1
Sk, S
∗ =
p⋃
k=1
(Sk ∪Kk).
Clearly, [S∗, S
∗] ⊇ C. Note that S∗ \S∗ 6= ∅ since C is not a singleton, but S∗ = ∅, S
∗ = N
are possible (see Figure 4, left). If S∗ 6= ∅ and S
∗ 6= N , we say that the class is normal.
Lemma 1. If there is a normal regular terminal class with upper and lower bounds
S∗, S∗, then subset S∗ has no ingoing arc in G
no
A
, and S∗ has no outgoing arc in Gyes
A
.
(see proof in the appendix) From this we get a simple condition to test the existence
of normal regular terminal classes. To this end, we introduce for an agent i ∈ N its
closure in Gno
A
, denoted by cl(i), which is the set of agents which can reach i by a path
in Gno
A
. By convention, i ∈ cl(i).
Theorem 5. Consider an influence process B based on aggregation functions A. Then
there is no normal regular terminal class if for each i ∈ N , every agent outside cl(i) can
be reached by a path from cl(i) in Gyes
A
.
(see proof in the appendix)
There are two simple particular cases with influential agents where regular terminal
classes cannot occur: when either Gyes
A
or Gno
A
is strongly connected (by Theorem 5),
or when there exists one agent who is no-influential for all agents, including himself (by
Lemma 1). Gyes
A
or Gno
A
strongly connected means that more or less directly, all agents are
yes- or no- influential for all agents, therefore a dichotomy among agents cannot occur.
Also, if one agent is influential for all the others, a consensus will finally emerge around
this agent.
4.4 Cyclic terminal classes
We turn to the study of cyclic classes. Since the presence of such classes is not a desirable
feature (no convergence of opinion can occur), we want to find some sufficient condition
to avoid cyclic classes. We begin by giving some sufficient conditions in the general case.
Although these are rather strong conditions, they are very easy to check.
Proposition 1. Consider an influence process B based on aggregation functionsA. Then
there is no cyclic class, if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(i) There exists j ∈ N such that Aj takes values 0,1 only for ∅, N .
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(ii) There exists j ∈ N such that all agents are yes- and no-influential for j.
(iii) i is yes- and no-influential for i, for all i ∈ N .
(see proof in the appendix)
We suppose now that A is Boolean. The next result shows that any cycle in the
transition graph induces a cycle in the hypergraph of yes-influence7.
Theorem 6. Let A be Boolean, and {S1, S2, . . . , Sk} be a cyclic class. Then there exists
a hypercycle of length rk for some integer r, among agents in S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sk in the yes-
influence hypergraph Hyes
A
.
(see proof in the appendix)
The condition is not necessary, as shown by the example of the majority function.
Indeed there are many cycles in the hypergraph of yes-influence8, although no cycle in
the transition graph.
Corollary 3. Suppose that A is Boolean. Then, there is no cyclic class if there is no
cycle in Hyes
A
.
5 Symmetric decomposable models
We exhibit now an important family of aggregation functions and examine its properties.
Definition 7. An aggregation function Ai is said to be decomposable if all its yes- and
no-influential coalitions are singletons. An aggregation function is symmetric if it has the
same yes- and no-influential coalitions.
Similarly, an influence model based on aggregation functions is decomposable (resp.,
symmetric) if all its aggregation functions are decomposable (resp., symmetric).
Proposition 2. The family of generalized weighted means, defined by
Mf (x1, . . . , xn) = f
−1
( n∑
i=1
wif(xi)
)
, (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]
n,
with wi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n,
∑n
i=1 wi = 1, and f a continuous automorphism on [0, 1],
is a family of decomposable symmetric aggregation functions. Moreover, an agent i is
yes-influential if and only if he is no-influential if and only if wi > 0.
Proof. Suppose that f(1) = 1 (the case f(1) = 0 works the same), and that S ⊂ N ,
|S| > 1 is yes-influential. Then Mf (1S) = f
−1(
∑
i∈S wi) > 0, which is equivalent to∑
i∈S wi > 0. On the other hand, for any i ∈ S we have Mf (1i) = f
−1(wi) = 0,
equivalent to wi = 0, a contradiction. Similarly, one can show that no coalition of size
greater than 1 is no-influential.
Now, i yes-influential iff f−1(wi) > 0 iff wi > 0 iff
∑
j 6=iwj < 1 iff f
−1(
∑
j 6=iwj) < 1
iff i is no-influential.
7Recall from Section 3 that in the case of a Boolean A, the yes-influence hypergraph determines
entirely the function.
8For example, with n = 3, 12 influences 3, 23 influences 1, 13 influences 2, 12 influences 3, etc.
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When f = Id, we recover the weighted arithmetic mean (WAM) used in the DeGroot
model. Observe that Proposition 2 implies that any directed graph on N can be the
influence graph of some WAM-based model.
Let us consider the class of symmetric decomposable aggregation models. We will
simply write G from now on for the influence graph, and the undirected version of G will
be denoted by G0. An arc from j to i in G will be denoted by j → i. Denote by SDB(N)
the set of 0-1 matrices being the reduced matrix of some symmetric decomposable model
on N . It is useful to rewrite for this class of models the conditions in Theorem 1 since
they become much simpler:
b˜S,T = 1 if and only if
{
∀i ∈ T, ∃j ∈ S such that j → i in G; and
∀i 6∈ T, ∃j 6∈ S such that j → i in G.
(4)
The symmetry of (4) immediately implies that for every S, T ∈ 2N ,
b˜S,T = 1⇔ b˜N\S,N\T = 1. (5)
The following result is fundamental.
Theorem 7. Any symmetric decomposable model is qualitatively equivalent to a unique
WAM model. Conversely, any WAM model is qualitatively equivalent to some symmetric
decomposable model.
(see proof in the appendix)
It follows that the study of terminal classes for symmetric decomposable models
amounts to the study of WAM models. The existence of terminal states is easy to check
by using Theorem 3 and Corollary 2: S 6= ∅, N is a nontrivial terminal state if and only
if S is a connected component in G0, and no nontrivial terminal state exists if and only
if G0 is connected.
The existence of regular terminal classes is more tricky. The subsequent results give
some conditions for the existence of Boolean terminal classes.
Theorem 8. Let us consider a symmetric decomposable model. Consider S,K 6= ∅,
S ∪K 6= N . Then [S, S ∪K] is a Boolean terminal class if G satisfies the following six
conditions:
(i) The subgraph S has no ingoing arc;
(ii) Each i ∈ K has an arc j → i for some j ∈ S;
(iii) Each i ∈ S has an arc j → i with j ∈ S;
and conditions (i)’, (ii)’ and (iii)’, where S is replaced by N \ (S ∪ K). Moreover, the
conditions (i), (i)’, (iii) and (iii)’ above are also necessary. The following condition is
necessary:
(iv) For each i ∈ K, there is a path from S to i and a path from N \ (S ∪K) to i.
(see proof in the appendix)
A configuration of the influence graph satisfying the six conditions is illustrated on
Figure 5.
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Figure 5: An example of structure of the influence graph having a Boolean terminal class
6 An empirical example
We study an empirical example based on the advice network of Krackhardt (1987) who
collected data from managers of a small manufacturing firm in the US (100 employees
and 21 managers) about who sought advice from whom. Based on these data, Jackson
(2008) developed a social influence matrix as defined in the context of the DeGroot
model (see Section 7 for a brief description). He proved that the managers converge to
the same opinion in [0, 1]. We provide a different analysis, considering the advice network
of Krackhardt as giving information on the influence between managers.
Among the different graphs given in Krackhardt (1987), we use the graph of the
consensus structure, meaning that there is an arc from manager i to manager j if there
is a majority of people who think that i is asking advice to j. We make the assumption
that there are only influential agents and no influential coalition, that an agent i asking
advice to agent j means that j influences i, and that there is no mean to distinguish from
the data the yes- and no-influence. It follows that we are in a situation representable by
a symmetric decomposable model, and that the influence graph is simply the graph of
the consensus structure, with all arcs inverted. We may suppose that each agent takes
also his own opinion into account, which means that each node of the graph has a loop
(for clarity they are not figured on the graph) (see Fig. 6).
We analyze the convergence of the model using our results. First, there is no nontrivial
terminal state because G0 is connected (see Corollary 2 (iii)). Also, there is no cyclic
class by the presence of loops on every node (see Proposition 1 (iii)).
Let us check if regular terminal classes may exist. We may for this use either Theo-
rem 5 (sufficient condition for avoiding any normal regular class) or Theorem 8 to check
if a given interval [S, S ∪K] is a Boolean terminal class. In both cases, one has to find
subgraphs in G with no ingoing arc, which amounts to construct the closure cl(i) of each
agent, and to find agents outside cl(i) reachable from cl(i) in G.
Starting with 2 (one of the nodes having the higher number of conenctions), 2 re-
ceives arcs from 4, 7, 14, 18 and 21. These nodes in turn receive arcs from 6, 8,
9, 10, 11, then we find 5, 12, 19, 20, and there is no new node any more. Hence
cl(2) = {2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21}. We find that all the remaining
agents 1, 3, 13, 16, 17 receive an arc from cl(2), hence the condition of Theorem 5
for cl(2) is satisfied (see Figure 7). In terms of Theorem 8, setting S = cl(2), we find
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Figure 6: The graph of influence in the Krackhardt example
K = {1, 3, 13, 16, 17} = N \ S. It follows that N \ (S ∪K) = ∅, hence [S, S ∪K] is not a
terminal class.
Since agent 2 influences agents 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,
the closure of these agents contains cl(2), hence the same conclusion is reached for these
agents. For the remaining ones, we find that 6 is influenced by 7 who is influenced by 2,
hence again cl(6) contains cl(2). Also, 8, 10 and 12 receive indirectly an influence from 2,
hence their closure contain cl(2). In summary, for each agent i, every agent outside cl(i)
receives an arc from cl(i). By Theorem 5, we can conclude that no normal regular class
exists.
7 Related literature
The idea of an aggregation model where each agent aggregates the opinions of the others
is not that new, since it can be traced back at least to the model of DeGroot. We give
a brief description of this model, pointing out the differences with our approach. In this
model, the opinion of agent i at time t is a number ai(t) ∈ [0, 1]. Each agent i aggregates
the opinion of all agents by a weighted sum
∑
j w
i
jaj(t), hence the opinion vector a(t+1)
at time t+1 is given by a(t+1) =Wa(t), where W = [wij]i,j∈N is the matrix of weights.
Since W is a row-stochastic matrix, the study of convergence of the opinion relies on
results on stochastic matrices, and it is proved that under mild assumptions, all agents
converge to the same opinion α ∈ [0, 1]. It should be noted that the DeGroot model is
not a stochastic process since the state of opinion of each agent is purely deterministic.
By contrast, our model is a stochastic process, where each agent has only two possible
states of opinion (yes or no). The probability of saying ‘yes’ for a given agent at next step
is obtained as an aggregation (in particular a weighted sum is possible) of the opinions
of all agents (with ‘yes’ coded by 1, and ‘no’ by 0). The convergence of the opinions is
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Figure 7: Closure of agent 2 (in grey). Each agent outside cl(2) receives an arc from
cl(2).
ruled by the stochastic process, which is, in our study, a Markov chain9.
Although numerous works in the network literature deal with the DeGroot model
and its variations, they usually assume that the aggregation of opinions is done through
a convex combination; see e.g. Jackson (2008) for a survey. Our model covers many
existing models of opinion formation, since we allow for arbitrary aggregation functions.
Jackson (2008) and Golub and Jackson (2010) examine a model, in which agents
communicate in a social network and update their beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted
averages of their neighbors’ opinions. In the model of information transmission and
opinion formation by DeMarzo et al. (2003) the agents in a network try to estimate some
unknown parameter, which allows updating to vary over time, i.e., an agent may place
more or less weight on his own belief over time. Pan (2010) proposes a variation of the
DeGroot model in which the influence weight matrix is time-varying. Influence networks
and the role of social influence in determining distinct collective outcomes is also examined
in Lo´pez-Pintado (2008, 2010); Lo´pez-Pintado and Watts (2008). Calvo´-Armengol and
Jackson (2009) consider an overlapping-generations model which generates a Markov
process. Agents representing some dynasties of a community take binary actions, and the
state of the community contains the yes-no actions of all dynasties. Bu¨chel et al. (2011)
introduce a generalization of the DeGroot model and study the transmission of cultural
traits from one generation to the next one. Bu¨chel et al. (2012) analyze an influence model
in which agents may misrepresent their opinion in a conforming or counter-conforming
way. A model of strategic influence is studied in Galeotti and Goyal (2009).
Another stream of literature concerns diffusion through networks, like diffusion of
innovation or spread of disease; see Jackson (2008) for an overview. Contagion – which
9Our proposal is closer to the one of Asavathiratham (2000), although there are important differences
in the dynamic aspect.
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occurs if an action can spread from a finite set of individuals to the whole population
– is one of the phenomena related to the process of opinion formation. The model of
influence based on aggregation function could be used to analyze social interactions with
contagion features. However, since the present model of influence assumes that the set of
agents is finite, to analyze frameworks of diffusion with infinitely many individuals, like
e.g. the contagion model by Morris (2000), an analogous aggregation model of influence
with an infinite set of agents should be used.
There is a numerous literature on social learning, in particular, in the context of social
networks; see, e.g., Banerjee (1992); Ellison (1993); Bala and Goyal (1998, 2001); Gale
and Kariv (2003); Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004). While in social learning models agents
observe choices over time and update their beliefs accordingly, in the influence framework
the choices depend on the influence of others.
Furthermore, we like to mention the percolation theory which describes the behavior
of connected clusters in a random graph, and the Ising and Potts models in statistical
mechanics. The Ising model consists of discrete variables called spins that can be in one
of two states and interact at most with their nearest neighbors.
Although we are not aware of other studies in the field of influence and social networks
that consider a general class of aggregation functions like in our model, it is possible to
find related studies in discrete mathematics concerning mainly Boolean functions, often
applied to bioinformatics. There is a remarkable paper by Aracena et al. (2004), that we
have already cited above. Here, functions from {0, 1, . . . , m−1}n to {0, 1, . . . , m−1}n are
considered, which corresponds in our framework to n agents having m possible answers,
and the aggregation gives directly the opinions of the agents after influence (hence the case
m = 2 is exactly our influence model with A being Boolean). Aracena et al. (2004) study
in particular the cyclic terminal classes, supposing some properties, like monotonicity of
the aggregation functions and symmetry of the graph of influence. Re´my et al. (2008)
provide also an interesting study of cyclic terminal classes when the aggregation functions
are Boolean functions, with the restriction that transitions are of the type S → S ∪ i or
S → S \ i, for S ⊆ N .
Lastly, we mention Mueller-Frank (2010) who provides a study of convergence applied
to non-Bayesian learning in social networks. Here, aggregation functions which are con-
tinuous and have a special property called “constricting” are considered. Supposing a
graph depicting neighboring relations among agents, Ai is constricting if Ai(x) is com-
prised between the minimum and maximum of the xj , j ∈ Ni ∪ i, where Ni is the set of
neighbors of i. It is shown that for such functions, the process converges to a fixed point.
All these studies consider particular cases of aggregation functions, and up to our
knowledge there is no general study as the one we have undertaken in this paper.
8 Concluding remark
We like to elaborate a little bit more on the applicability of the aggregation model – the
issue already mentioned in the introduction and shown in the empirical example of the
advice network. Suppose one wants to model influence among a group of agents, just by
observation. Our sole assumption is that each agent aggregates the opinion of the other
agents plus himself to formulate his opinion, but we do not assume any knowledge about
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the type of aggregation functions, nor about the kind of correlation existing among the
agents. Theorem 1 tells us that the reduced matrix B˜ (hence the qualitative analysis of
convergence) can be recovered from the knowledge of the yes- and no-influential coalitions
for each agent. Moreover, various theorems (3 to 6, 8) permit to check the existence
of different types of terminal classes, only by the inspection of yes- and no-influential
coalitions.
The aggregation model can therefore be quite useful in practical situations. Influence
of agents on a given individual means nothing else than a particular way of aggregating the
opinions of the agents. The only limitation of the aggregation model is that aggregation
functions are monotonically increasing, therefore reactive behaviors (the more people say
’yes’, the more I am inclined to say ’no’) cannot be modeled in this framework. A much
more challenging issue would be to consider that some agents are reactive, while the
others are not. Now, it is unreasonable to assume (like it is done in the De Groot model)
that the aggregation functions of the agents are known: this would mean that for each
agent, the type of aggregation function (weighted average, ordered weighted average, etc.)
is known, as well as the parameters of this function. Agents act unconsciously and do
not have a precise idea – certainly not formalized to that level – how they are influenced.
Similarly, it seems difficult to get some knowledge about the correlation between agents.
On the other hand, it seems possible and much simpler to get some knowledge about
who influences whom (like in the Krackhardt’s example), and consequently, to determine
influential coalitions.
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Appendix - Proofs of theorems
Proof of Theorem 2
Throughout this section we use the convenient shorthand
(1S, xK) := (0 · · ·0 1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
x1x2 · · ·xk︸ ︷︷ ︸
K
)
for vectors in [0, 1]n. The following straightforward lemma is central for proving the
result.
Lemma 2. From each set S ∈ 2N , the number of possible transitions is of the form 2k,
for some k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, where k is the number of components in A(1S) different from
0 and 1. More precisely, if A(1S) = (1T , xK) with xi ∈ ]0, 1[ for all i ∈ K, then S has a
transition to any set in the Boolean lattice [T, T ∪K] := {S ′ ∈ 2N | T ⊆ S ′ ⊆ T ∪K}.
Proof. (of Theorem 2) Consider a terminal class C, and S ∈ C. Unless C is reduced to a
single state, S cannot be empty because from the empty set there is no other transition
than to itself, and so C would not be a class. One and only one of the following cases can
happen:
(i) A(1S) = 1S. Then S is a terminal state, i.e., C = {S}.
(ii) A(1S) = 1T , T 6= S. There is transition from S to T with certainty. If for
all sets in C the transitions are certain, the only possibility is that C is a cycle
S → T → · · · → S.
(iii) A(1S) = (1T , xK), with xi ∈ ]0, 1[ for any i ∈ K, |K| = k. From Lemma 2, there
are 2k transitions, which form the Boolean lattice [T, T ∪ K]. Then necessarily,
[T, T ∪K] is included in C, for if some set L ∈ [T, T ∪K] does not belong to C, there
would be a transition from S to L, i.e., an arc outgoing from the class, contradicting
that it is a terminal class.
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1. The first case (terminal states) being clear, let us study the second case (cycles),
and put C = {S1, . . . , Sk}. If the sequence S1, . . . , Sk with k ≥ 2 is a cycle, we must have:
A(1S1) = 1S2
A(1S2) = 1S3
... =
...
A(1Sk) = 1S1 .
Suppose that the vectors 1S1 , . . . , 1Sk are incomparable (i.e., no relation of inclusion occurs
among the Si’s). Then no condition due to the nondecreasingness of the Ai’s applies, and
therefore there is no contradiction among the above equations. Conversely, suppose there
exist Si, Sj in the sequence such that Si ⊆ Sj . By monotonicity of A this implies that
Si+1 = A(Si) ⊆ A(Sj) = Sj+1, etc. This causes a contradiction since we finally arrive at
Si ⊂ Sj ⊆ · · · ⊆ Si (letting Sk+1 := S1, etc.). By Sperner’s lemma, we know that the
longest possible sequence of incomparable sets has length
(
n
⌊n
2
⌋
)
, hence the bound on k.
2. We suppose that C is a terminal class, which is neither a cycle nor a singleton.
Then there exists a set S ′ ∈ C with several possible transitions, i.e., A(1S′) = (1S1, xK ′1),
with xi ∈ ]0, 1[, for all i ∈ K
′
1. We have S1 6= ∅, otherwise a transition to ∅ would be
possible, i.e., C is not terminal. Similarly, S1 ∪ K
′
1 6= N , otherwise a transition to N
would be possible. There may be several such S ′ with same S1 but different K
′
1. Call
S one of them with the largest K ′1, and put A(1S) = (1S1, xK1), |K1| =: k1. Then the
Boolean lattice C1 := [S1, S1 ∪K1] is the set of transitions from S and is included in C.
2.1. Suppose that for any T ∈ C1, we have A(1T ) = (1S1, x
T
K1
), with xTi ∈ [0, 1],
i ∈ K1. Then all transitions from a set of C1 remain in C1. It follows from the assumption
on C that C1 is a terminal class, and therefore C = C1. Note that monotonicity of the
aggregation functions entails that for any T, T ′ ∈ C1,
T ⊆ T ′ ⇔ xTK1 ≤ x
T ′
K1 ,
i.e., the vectors (xTK1)T∈C1 form a Boolean lattice isomorphic to [S1, S1 ∪K1].
Note that the xTK1 must be such that C1 is strongly connected. This is achieved, e.g.,
if xTi ∈ ]0, 1[, for all T ∈ C1.
2.2 Suppose on the contrary that C 6= C1, implying that there is some set S
′ ∈ C
with a different transition, say A(1S′) = (1S2, xK ′2), with S2 6⊇ S1 or S2 ∪K
′
2 6⊆ S1 ∪K1.
Again, among all S ′ with same S2 but different K
′
2, choose S with largest K
′
2 and put
A(1S) = (1S2, xK2), |K2| =: k2. Then the Boolean lattice C2 := [S2, S2 ∪K2] is the set of
transitions from S and is included in C.
Examining the transitions of all sets in C we eventually conclude that C = C1 ∪ C2 ∪
· · · ∪ Cp, where each Cj is a Boolean lattice [Sj , Sj ∪Kj ], defined as above. Note that at
least one Kj must be nonempty, otherwise each set has only one transition, and then the
only way to have a class is to have a cycle, a case which is excluded here.
There are two cases concerning transitions among the subcollections Cj . Let us take
w.l.o.g. C1 as starting point.
2.2.1. Suppose that for all T ∈ C1 we have A(1T ) = (1S2, x
T
K2
), with xTi ∈ [0, 1],
i ∈ K2, i.e., from any set of C1 there are only transitions to members of C2. Note that in
this case there is no special relation between S1 and S2.
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2.2.2. Suppose on the contrary that in C1 there is a set S with transition to, say, C2,
and another one T with transition to C3. Then monotonicity relations among the sets in
C1 induce monotonicity relations between S2, S3 and S2 ∪K2, S3 ∪K3.
If S ⊂ T , then monotonicity of the aggregation functions entails A(1S) ≤ A(1T ).
Supposing A(1S) = (1S2, x
S
K2
), xSi ∈ ]0, 1[ for all i in K2 and similarly for T , this implies
S2 ⊆ S3, S2 ∪K2 ⊆ S3 ∪K3 and x
S
i ≤ x
T
i for all i in K2 ∩K3.
If S and T are incomparable, then S2 and S3 can be also incomparable. In this case,
for S∩T and S∪T the transitions must satisfy A(1S∩T ) ≤ (1S2∩S3 , x
S∩T
K2∩K3
), and similarly
for A(1S∪T ). Note that necessarily S2 ∩ S3 6= ∅ and S2 ∪K2 ∪ S3 ∪K3 6= N , otherwise
the class would not be terminal. Also, from C1 there will be transitions to 4 different
subcollections, with bottom elements S2, S3, a subset of S2∩S3 (say, S2∧3) and a superset
of S2 ∪ S3, say S2∨3, respectively. Observe that the union of these subcollections has a
least and a greatest element, which are S2∧3 and S2∨3, respectively.
Proof of Theorem 3 and Corollary 2
We need first a basic lemma.
Lemma 3. Take S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅. Then S cannot be a terminal state if and only if, either
there exist S ′ ⊆ N \ S, i ∈ S such that S ′ is no-influential for i, or there exist S ′ ⊆ S,
i 6∈ S such that S ′ is yes-influential for i.
Proof. (of the Lemma) Sufficiency: Take S ′ ⊆ N \ S, i ∈ S, and suppose that S ′ is
no-influential in Ai. Then Ai(1S) ≤ Ai(1N\S′) < 1, hence S is not a terminal state by (3).
Now, suppose that S ′ ⊆ S, i 6∈ S, S ′ yes-influential in Ai. Then 0 < Ai(1S′) ≤ Ai(1S),
which implies that S is not a terminal state.
Necessity: Suppose that S is not a terminal state. Then by (3), either there is some
i ∈ S such that Ai(1S) < 1 or some i 6∈ S such that Ai(1S) > 0.
Suppose that for some i ∈ S, Ai(1S) < 1. Take the largest S
′ ⊇ S such that
Ai(1S′) < 1. Then N \ S
′ is no-influential for i. Similarly, suppose now that for some
i 6∈ S, Ai(1S) > 0. Take the smallest S
′ ⊆ S such that Ai(1S′) > 0. Then S
′ is influential
for i.
Proof. (of Theorem 3) By Lemma 3, we know that S 6= ∅, N is eliminated (from the set
of terminal states) if either there exist S ′ ⊆ N \ S, i ∈ S such that S ′ ∈ Cnoi , or S
′ ⊆ S,
i 6∈ S such that S ′ ∈ Cyesi . Putting the other way round, we have established two rules
Ryes,Rno:
Ryes : C ∈ Cyesi rules out every coalition S ∈ 2
N such that S ⊇ C and S 6∋ i
Rno : C ∈ Cnoi rules out every coalition S ∈ 2
N such that S ⊆ N \ C and S ∋ i.
Note that if C ∋ i and C ∈ Cyesi , it does not rule out any coalition (same for C
no
i ). This
shows that we can restrict to normal hyperarcs.
Take any S ⊆ N, ∅. If S is eliminated by Rno, it means that there is a hyperarc of
Hˆno
A
ingoing10 into S. Similarly, if S is eliminated by Ryes, there is some hyperarc of
Hˆ
yes
A
outgoing from S. Therefore, S is eliminated by Ryes or Rno if and only if S has
10See definition above Theorem 3.
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an ingoing hyperarc in the hypergraph H := (Hˆyes
A
)∗ ∪ Hˆno
A
. By Lemma 3, we conclude
that S is not a terminal state if and only if S has an ingoing hyperarc in the hypergraph
H .
Proof. (of Corollary 2)
(i) For a given node i ∈ N , R(i) denotes the set of nodes which can reach i by a
directed hyperpath.
Suppose that H is not strongly connected. Then there exist i, j ∈ N such that
R(i) 6∋ j. If R(i) = ∅, it means that {i} has no ingoing hyperarc. Otherwise we
have R(i) 6= ∅, N , and by definition R(i) has no ingoing hyperarc. In both cases
there exists a set S 6= ∅, N with no ingoing hyperarc.
The converse is false because the absence of ingoing hyperarcs does not mean the
absence of a path.
(ii) Suppose there exists a set S 6= ∅, N with no ingoing hyperarc. In particular, it has
no ingoing arc in the graph G := (Gyes
A
)∗ ∪Gno
A
. Clearly nodes in N \ S 6= ∅ are not
connected to those of S in G, therefore G is not strongly connected.
(iii) Clear from (i) and (ii).
Proof of Theorems 4 and 5, and Lemma 1
Proof. (of Theorem 4) Suppose [S, S ∪ K] is strongly connected in Γ. By definition of
an ingoing and an outgoing arc, we have to show that [S, S ∪K] is a Boolean terminal
class if and only if for all S ′ ⊆ N \ S and i ∈ S, S ′ is not no-influential for i, and for all
S ′ ⊆ S ∪K and i 6∈ S ∪K, S ′ is not yes-influential for i (we call this condition (∗)).
Necessity: Take S ′ ⊆ N \ S, i ∈ S, and suppose that S ′ is no-influential in Ai.
Then Ai(1S) ≤ Ai(1N\S′) < 1, hence [S, S ∪K] cannot be a Boolean terminal class, for
any K. Now, suppose that S ′ ⊆ S ∪ K, i 6∈ S ∪ K, S ′ is yes-influential in Ai. Then
0 < Ai(1S′) ≤ Ai(1S∪K), which implies that [S, S ∪K] is not a terminal class.
Sufficiency: Suppose that [S, S∪K] is not a Boolean terminal class. Since [S, S∪K] is
strongly connected, this means that either [S, S ∪K] is not minimal for this property, or
there is a possible transition outside the interval, which in fact amounts to the same. Then
there exists S ′ ∈ [S, S ∪K] such that either Ai(1S′) < 1 for some i ∈ S, or Ai(1S′) > 0
for some i 6∈ S ∪ K. Suppose first that for some i ∈ S, Ai(1S′) < 1. Take the largest
S ′′ ⊇ S ′ s.t. Ai(1S′′) < 1. Then N \ S
′′ ⊆ N \ S and is no-influential for i. Now, suppose
that for some i 6∈ S ∪K, Ai(1S′) > 0. Take the smallest S
′′ ⊆ S ′ such that Ai(1S′′) > 0.
Then S ′′ ⊆ S ∪K and is yes-influential for i. In both cases, (∗) is violated.
We provide a counterexample with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, showing that without supposing
that [S, S ∪K] is strongly connected, the theorem does not hold, i.e., conditions (i) and
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(ii) alone cannot imply that the interval [S, S ∪ K] is strongly connected. Consider A
partially specified by:
A(11) = (1, x, x, 0, 0), A(1123) = (1, 1, x, x, 0)
A(112) = (1, 1, x, 0, 0), A(1124) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
A(113) = (1, 1, x, 0, 0), A(1134) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
A(114) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0), A(11234) = (1, 1, 1, x, 0)
with x > 0. Then the interval [1, 1234] satisfies conditions (i) and (ii), but it is not
strongly connected in Γ (see the transition graph Γ on Figure 8).
1
12 13 14
123 124 134
1234
Figure 8: Transition graph of the counterexample
Proof. (of Lemma 1) Suppose that C is a regular terminal class with bounds S∗, S
∗. Then
for all S ′ ∈ C, we must have
Ai(1S′) =
{
1, if i ∈ S∗ (∗)
0, if i 6∈ S∗. (∗∗)
Suppose i ∈ S∗ and Ai has a no-influential player j ∈ N \ S∗. Take S
′ ∈ C such that
j 6∈ S ′. This is always possible since necessarily one of the Sk’s does not contain j (for
if j ∈ Sk for all k = 1, . . . , p, then j ∈ S∗). This implies 1 > Ai(1N\j) ≥ Ai(1S′), which
contradicts (*). Hence C is not terminal.
Suppose now that i 6∈ S∗ and Ai has a yes-influential player j ∈ S
∗. Take S ′ ∈ C such
that j ∈ S ′. Again this is always possible since j ∈ S∗ implies j ∈ Sk ∪Kk for some k.
Then Ai(1S′) ≥ Ai(1j) > 0, which contradicts (**), proving that C is not terminal.
Proof. (of Theorem 5) By applying the above lemma to every pair S∗, S
∗ with S∗ 6= ∅,
S∗ 6= N , S∗ ⊂ S
∗, one can exclude any normal regular terminal class not reduced to the
trivial terminal classes. Put differently, any such pair S∗, S
∗ must be excluded by the
application of the following rules:
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Ryes: j yes-influential for i rules out every regular class with upper bound S∗,
such that i 6∈ S∗, j ∈ S∗ (arc outgoing from S∗ in the graph of yes-influence).
Rno: j no-influential for i rules out every regular class with lower bound S∗,
such that i ∈ S∗, j 6∈ S∗ (arc going into S∗ in the graph of no-influence).
We prove that rules Ryes,Rno rule out all normal regular classes if and only if for each
agent i, every agent j outside cl(i) can be reached by a yes-path.
Necessity: Suppose there exist i, j ∈ N such that i cannot be reached by a yes-path
from cl(j). Consider R(i), the set of nodes that can reach i by a yes-path. Note that
R(i)∩cl(j) = ∅. Then a regular terminal class with lower and upper bounds cl(j), N \R(i)
is possible, because cl(j) is not ruled out by Rno (no ingoing no-arc), and N \ R(i) can
be ruled out only by a yes-arc going into R(i), which does not exist by definition of R(i).
Sufficiency: Take any normal regular class with bounds S∗, S
∗, i.e., with 1 ≤ |S∗| <
n− 1 and 2 ≤ |S∗| < n. If S∗ has an ingoing no-arc, it is ruled out by R
no. If it has no
ingoing no-arc, then it is either a closure of some agent, or a union of closures (indeed, for
each i ∈ S∗, S∗ must contain cl(i)). By hypothesis every node outside S∗ (and therefore
outside S∗) is linked to S∗ by a yes-path. Since N \ S
∗ is nonempty by the normality
assumption, taking any node i in N \S∗, there is a yes-path from S∗ to i, hence necessarily
a yes-arc outgoing from S∗. Therefore, S∗ is ruled out by Ryes.
Proofs of Proposition 1 and Theorem 6
We need the following lemma for the proof of Proposition 1 (iii).
Lemma 4. Suppose there is a cyclic class with S1, S2 consecutive. Then Ai cannot have
a no-influential player j ∈ N \ S1 if i ∈ S2, or a yes-influential player j ∈ S1 if i 6∈ S2.
Proof. (of the Lemma) Since S2 is the successor of S1 in the cycle, we have Ai(1S1) = 1
if i ∈ S2 and 0 otherwise. Suppose that j ∈ S1 is yes-influential in Ai with i 6∈ S2. Then
0 < Ai(1j) ≤ Ai(1S1) = 0, a contradiction. Similarly, if j 6∈ S1 is no-influential in Ai with
i ∈ S2, we have 1 = Ai(1S1) ≤ Ai(1N\j) < 1, again a contradiction.
Proof. (of Proposition 1)
(i) Because of Aj, for no set S 6= ∅, N , there can be a transition to a set T with
probability 1, which forbids the existence of cycles.
(ii) If all agents are yes- and no-influential in Aj , then 0 < Aj(1i) < 1 for all i ∈ N .
Indeed, 1 = Aj(1i) ≤ Aj(1N\k) for any k 6= i, contradicting the fact that k is no-
influential in Aj . Similarly, 0 < Aj(1N\i) < 1 holds for any i ∈ N . It follows by
monotonicity that Aj(1S) 6= 0, 1 for all S 6= ∅, N , which by (i) proves the result.
(iii) From Lemma 4, i yes- and no-influential in Ai forbids any cycle with consecutive
S1, S2 such that S1 ∋ i and S2 6∋ i, or S1 6∋ i and S2 ∋ i. Since S1, S2 must be
incomparable, S1 = {i} is ruled out, as well as S1 = N \ i. Take S1 ⊂ N , S1 6= ∅.
Then S2 = L ∪ T , with L ⊆ N \ S1, L 6= ∅ and T ⊆ S1. Take i ∈ S1. The fact
that i is influential in Ai forbids T 6∋ i, for all L. Since this holds for all i ∈ S1, it
follows that no T is possible, hence no S2.
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Proof. (of Theorem 6) Let us consider a cycle C = {S1, . . . , Sk}, setting Sk+1 = S1, in the
transition graph. Take jk,1 ∈ Sk \S1, which is always possible since sets are incomparable
in a cycle. Since Ajk,1(1Sk−1) = 1 and aggregation functions are 0-1-valued, there exists
Ck−1,1 ⊆ Sk−1 which is influential for jk,1. Note that Ck−1,1 ⊆ Sk−1 ∩ Sk is impossible,
otherwise one would have 1 = Ajk,1(1Ck−1,1) ≤ Ajk,1(1Sk), contradicting the fact that
the transition Sk to S1 is certain. Now take some jk−1,1 ∈ Ck−1,1 \ Sk. By the same
reasoning, it exists Ck−2,1 ⊆ Sk−2 which is influential for jk−1,1. Let us denote this by
Ck−2,1 → jk−1,1 ∈ Ck−1,1 → jk,1. We can repeat this procedure till the set S1, which gives
C1,1 → j2,1 ∈ C2,1 → j3,1 ∈ C3,1 → · · ·Ck−2,1 → jk−1,1 ∈ Ck−1,1 → jk,1.
The predecessor of S1 in the cycle being Sk, there exists also a set Ck,2 ⊆ Sk which is
influential for some j1,1 chosen in C1,1 \ S2. Suppose that jk,1 ∈ Ck,2. Then we obtain
jk,1 ∈ Ck,2 → j1,1 ∈ C1,1 → j2,1 ∈ C2,1 → j3,1 ∈ C3,1 → · · ·Ck−2,1 → jk−1,1 ∈ Ck−1,1 → jk,1,
which is a cycle in the hypergraph Hyes
A
of length k. Suppose on the contrary that
jk,1 6∈ Ck,2. Then choose some jk,2 ∈ Ck,2 \ S1, and there will exist a set Ck−1,2 ⊆ Sk−1
influencing jk,2. If jk−1,1 ∈ Ck−1,2, we get also a cycle of length k. Suppose this is not
the case, and continue the procedure, creating sets Ci,ℓ ⊆ Si and choosing elements ji,ℓ in
Ci,ℓ \Si, different from the previous ones ji,ℓ−1, . . . , ji,1. By finiteness of the sets Si \Si+1
for all i = 1, . . . , k, it must happen that at some stage Ci,ℓ ∋ ji,ℓ′ for ℓ
′ < ℓ, creating a
cycle of length (ℓ− ℓ′)k.
Proof of Theorem 7
LetA be a symmetric decomposable model, and let Γ be its transition graph (equivalently
its reduced matrix B˜).
Claim 1: Two distinct matrices B˜, B˜′ ∈ SDB induce two distinct influence graphs
G,G′. Indeed, if B˜, B˜′ are distinct, there exist S, T ∈ 2N such that bS,T = 1 and b
′
S,T = 0.
By (4) this implies that for all i ∈ T there is an arc j → i in G with j ∈ S, and for all
i 6∈ T , an arc j → i with j 6∈ S, while in G′, either there exists some i ∈ T with no arc
j → i such that j ∈ S, or there is some i 6∈ T with no arc from N \ S. Hence the two
graphs differ.
Claim 2: Two distinct influence graphs G,G′ correspond to two distinct reduced
matrices B˜, B˜′ ∈ SDB.
Proof of Claim 2: Since G 6= G′, suppose w.l.o.g. that there is an arc i → j in G′
which is not in G. It follows from the first condition of (4) that bi,T = 0 for all T ∋ j.
Choose T ⊆ N \ j such that bi,T > 0. Such a T necessarily exists otherwise there
would be no transition from the state {i}. We claim that b′i,T∪j > 0, showing that B˜ and
B˜′ differ, since we have bi,T∪j = 0.
To prove b′i,T∪j > 0 we first need to prove that for each k ∈ T ∪ j, the arc i → k
exists. We know that for k = j it exists. If an arc exists for all other k ∈ T we are done.
Otherwise, by (4) again, b′i,T = 0, so that B˜ 6= B˜
′. Second, we need to prove that for
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each k 6∈ T ∪ j, there is an arc l → k for some l 6= i. If this is true, we are done. If not,
some k ∈ N \ (T ∪ j) has no arc from an element l 6= i. Again, this implies that b′i,T = 0,
hence the two matrices differ.
As a consequence of the two claims, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
SDB(N) and the set of directed graphs on N .
By the above remark, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of di-
rected graphs and the set of WAM models. Since the correspondence between symmetric
decomposable models and SDB(N) is onto, the theorem is proved.
Proof of Theorem 8
We begin by proving a simple fact.
Lemma 5. Consider a symmetric decomposable aggregation model. Then for any ∅ 6=
S ⊂ N , any ∅ 6= K ⊂ N \ S, [S, S ∪ K] is a Boolean terminal class if and only if
[N \ (S ∪K), N \ S] is a Boolean terminal class.
Proof. (of the Lemma) First we prove that [S, S ∪K] is a class iff [N \ (S ∪K), N \ S]
is a class. [S, S ∪ K] is a class iff for all T, T ′ ∈ [S, S ∪ K], there is a path from T to
T ′ in the transition graph, i.e., a sequence T = T1, T2, . . . , Tk = T
′ with bTi,Ti+1 > 0 for
i = 1, . . . , k − 1. Since by (5) bTi,Ti+1 > 0 iff bN\Ti,N\Ti+1 > 0, this is equivalent to have
a path from N \ T to N \ T ′ for every T, T ′ ∈ [S, S ∪K], which is equivalent to the say
that [N \ (S ∪K), N \ S] is a class.
Second, we prove that [S, S ∪K] is terminal iff [N \ (S ∪K), N \ S] is. We know by
Th. 5 of the paper that [S, S ∪K] is terminal iff there is no ingoing arc into S and no
outgoing arc from S ∪K in the influential graph. These conditions are equivalent to say
that there is no outgoing arc from N \ S and no ingoing arc into N \ (S ∪K), which is
equivalent to the desired result.
Proof. (of Theorem 8) 1. Assume that the six conditions hold. We prove first that
[S, S ∪ K] is strongly connected in the transition graph Γ. It suffices to show that
bT,T ′ > 0 for any T, T
′ ∈ [S, S ∪K]. By (4), we have to prove that (a) any i ∈ T ′ has an
ingoing arc from T , and (b) any i ∈ N \ T ′ has an ingoing arc from N \ T .
(a): T, T ′ contain S and possibly elements of K. For i ∈ S, by condition (iii), i has
an ingoing arc from S, thus from T . For i ∈ K, use condition (ii) instead.
(b): N \ T ′ and N \ T contain N \ (S ∪ K) and possibly elements of K. For all
i ∈ N \ (S ∪ K), there is an ingoing arc from N \ (S ∪ K) by (iii)’. Consider then
i ∈ K ∩ (N \ T ′), it has also an arc from N \ (S ∪K) by (ii)’.
Hence [S, S ∪K] is strongly connected. By Theorem 4 it remains to prove that there
is no ingoing arc into S, and no outgoing arc from S ∪K. These conditions are fulfilled
by conditions (i) and (i)’.
2. We know by Theorem 4 and Lemma 5 that (i) and (i)’ are necessary.
Suppose that some i ∈ S has no ingoing arc from S. Then bS,T = 0 for any T ∈
[S, S ∪ K] since bS,T > 0 implies that each i ∈ S has an ingoing arc from S by (4).
Therefore, [S, S ∪ K] is not a class since it is not strongly connected. This shows that
(iii) is necessary.
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By symmetry (see Lemma 5), (iii’) is also necessary.
3. We prove that (iv) is necessary for S. Define K0 the (possibly empty) set of
elements of K which are connected to S by some path. Suppose that K \K0 6= ∅, i.e.,
there are elements in K not connected to S. We claim that there is no transition from
some T in [S, S ∪K0] to some T
′ in [S, S ∪K] containing an element of K \K0 , which
suffices to prove that [S, S ∪K] is not a class. Indeed, if such a transition would exist,
by (4) there would be an arc j → k with j ∈ K0 and k ∈ K \K0. Such an arc cannot
exist by definition of K0. Hence, we have necessarily K0 = K.
Now, by Lemma 5, (iv) is also necessary for N \ (S ∪K).
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